The impact of defence industry influence on state policy-making in Belgium

A recent report by the Belgian peace organisation Vredesactie illustrates how the arms industry has access at every stage of the decision-making process at EU-level.[i] However, it is not just in the EU institutions in Brussels where such corporate influence on policy-making is apparent; it also happens in Belgium’s national political institutions. By drawing upon three recent examples, this essay not only seeks to illustrate the intimate ties between the defence industry and policy-making in Belgium, but also how this country’s close ties with France risks augmenting systemic corruption, especially in the realm of defence procurement. Given that, of all G7 nations, France has been identified as most prone to corruption in its defence and security sector,[ii] it will be important for Belgium to make all (inter)national channels of lobbying fully transparent.

A first and most telling example of undue relations between the arms industry and policy-making in Belgium occurred in the context of the Kazakhgate bribe scandal. Former president of the Belgian Senate and founding member of Eurodefense Belgium, Armand De Decker,[iii] has been accused of abusing his political position to interfere in Belgian law-making. By pushing forward new legislation in 2011 that allows defendants to avoid imprisonment through financial settlement (the so-called ‘afkoopwet’), he managed to halt a legal process for tax fraud against Patokh Chodiev, a rich Belgian-Kazakh businessman. What is striking is that De Decker’s involvement took place ten days before an important helicopter deal was concluded between the French and the Kazakh government. Investigative research revealed that De Decker undertook this role following financial incentives provided by the office of French President Sarkozy.[iv]

A second and recent illustration of entangled political and business interests concerns the renewal and replacement of F16 warplanes in Belgium. With only one in four Belgians in favour of the very expensive military upgrade, this is a highly controversial issue and concerns have been raised about the role of economic compensation to the Belgian government in the purchase of warplanes.[v] Whilst initially five arms companies were in the running, two companies (Boeing and Saab) have now withdrawn from the bidding process, blaming Belgium for allowing unfair competition. Belgian politicians have become increasingly annoyed with the behaviour of the French government, who, regardless of having put forward a limited proposal, insists that Belgium should buy its ‘Rafale’ plane (produced by Dassault), threatening to stop various other business projects in Belgium should this not occur.[vi] Given the French ownership of many businesses in Belgium, both within (e.g. Sabca, Thales Belgium, Safran) and outside (e.g. BNP Paribas, Electrabel) the defence sector, Belgium has not always been able to successfully counter opaque French interference in its internal affairs.[vii]

A last instance of questionable lobby-work can be found in the billion-euro weapons deal that the Belgium-based but French-owned arms company CMI[viii] concluded with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in 2015.[ix] What is interesting is the key role that two former defence ministers, Belgian ex-minister Jean-Pol Poncelet and French ex-minister Gérard Longuet, played in the forging of the CMI-deal. Poncelet joined the CMI Board two months before the deal was concluded.[x] Thanks to lobby work by the ex-ministers, Longuet’s region of residence – Lorraine – will host a training site for Saudi soldiers, for which the regional parliament has approved a subsidy of €600 000, on top of the €2.3 million of public money already allocated to the project.[xi] Given the dubious human rights record of KSA and its role in the proxy-war against the Houthis in Yemen, it is surprising that so much public money is invested in a project that seeks to train Saudis.

In conclusion, these three examples show the risk of undue influence by the defence industry in Belgian defence matters, especially in the realm of procurement. In particular, the risk for spill-over of French practices, where business and politics is more firmly intertwined and hardly questioned, requires vigilance in Belgium. Future research will be needed to make all channels of lobbying and advice transparent in Belgium, including those used by French officials and businesspeople.[xii]

[i] Vranken, B. “Securing Profits. How the arms lobby is hijacking Europe’s defence policy.” Vredesactie. https://www.vredesactie.be/sites/default/files/pdf/Securing_profits_web.pdf

[ii] Transparency International. “Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index - France.” http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/france/

[iii] Eurodefense Belgium. “Members/Membres.” http://www.eurodefense-belgium.eu/12-Members.html

[iv] Lemonde.fr avec AFP. “Quand l’ex president du Sénat belge intervenait pour l’Elysée en faveur d’un oligarque Kazakh.” Le Monde. November 11, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/11/05/quand-le-president-du-senat-belge-intervenait-pour-l-elysee-en-faveur-d-un-oligarque-kazakh_5026068_3224.html

[v] Parliamentary questions about the topic can be found on the website of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Especially questions by Green/Ecolo members of parliament (e.g. Wouter De Vriendt, Benoit Hellings) have focused on the need for a just procedure for buying new airplanes. More info: https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=none&language=nl&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/search/search_new.cfm?db=QRVA

[vi] Tanghe, N. & Vanschoubroek, C. “Durft Frankrijk ons opnieuw te chanteren?” De Standaard. January 6, 2018. http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180105_03282453

[vii] Staff member Vredesactie België, personal communication with author, January 5, 2017.

[viii] Groupe Cockerill Maintenance & Ingénierie (CMI) is owned by French businessman Bernard Serin. Information about this business and its professional and political links can be found on the website of GRIP (http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1644) and Open The Box (https://openthebox.be/company/BE0432488059).

[ix] While efforts were made to cover up that KSA was a key recipient of the arms, by means of the intermediate Canadian company General Dynamics (GDLS), it was clear that a large part of the 3.2 billion euro of tank turrets, technology and soldier training were meant for the Saudi army.

[x] More information about the CMI board members and their corrupt past can be found in following article: Cochez, T. & Walraven, J. “Ex-defensieministers fiksen Belgische wapendeal met Saudi’s.” Apache. January 5, 2016. https://www.apache.be/2016/01/05/ex-defensieministers-fiksen-belgische-wapendeal-met-saudis/

[xi] “Lorraine: 2,9 millions d'euros d'aides publiques pour un centre qui formera des militaires saoudiens.” RT France. December 8, 2015. https://francais.rt.com/international/11770-lorraine-29-millions-deuros-daides

[xii] The proposal for a transparency register by political parties Groen and Ecolo, which was rejected by the majority of parliament in the summer of 2017, could be a starting point for this kind of future research. More information about the transparency register can be found on the website of Green MP Wouter De Vriendt: http://www.wouterdevriendt.be/nieuws/nieuws_detail.php?wdb_id=622&wdbt_id=3